By ROGERS TULYAHABWE
On the morning of 17 December 2010, a young Tunisian man named Mohamed Bouazizi went to work on a normal day. He was 26 years old, had failed to find formal employment and had resorted to selling vegetables and fruit from a street cart in Sidi Bouzid, a small town in central Tunisia.He was a modest business to sustain his family. That morning, municipal authorities confiscated his weighing scales and produce. Reports of what followed differ in some details, but the general issue was that Bouazizi had been subjected to harassment and humiliation by local authorities, with allegations of corruption and abuse of power. Unable to secure redress, in an act of desperation and protest, Bouazizi set himself on fire outside the governor’s office and died on 4 January 2011.
His death became the symbol of a national movement against unemployment, corruption, inequality, political repression and a government increasingly disconnected from the everyday experiences of its citizens, triggered demonstrations that quickly spread across Tunisia, eventually forcing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled the country for 23 years, out of power. What followed became known as the Arab Spring, a wave of protests and political uprisings that swept across several countries in North Africa and the Middle East
Bouazizi did not bring down the Tunisian government because his vegetables had been confiscated. His story resonated with millions because it represented years of accumulated frustration over unemployment, corruption, economic exclusion, inequality and a government increasingly disconnected from the everyday experiences of its people. He became a symbol of a much deeper feeling that working hard no longer guaranteed dignity or economic security, and that public institutions had become more concerned with exercising authority than addressing people’s concerns.
Now, I would be mistaken to explain the Arab Spring as a rebellion caused by poverty alone. Some of the countries involved had functioning economies, established commercial sectors and huge natural resources.
In Tunisia, years of economic growth had failed to translate into equal opportunities. Unemployment among young people, particularly educated graduates, remained high. Economic opportunities were concentrated around politically connected business networks, while ordinary entrepreneurs struggled with bureaucracy, corruption and arbitrary treatment by public officials. The government of Ben Ali projected an image of economic stability and modernisation. Yet beneath it was a growing population that felt excluded from the benefits of development.
There were a number of interconnected factors behind the uprising.
First, the cost of living and economic exclusion. Rising food prices, unemployment and declining purchasing power made ordinary life increasingly difficult.
Second, corruption and the unequal distribution of economic opportunities. Citizens increasingly believed that political connections mattered more than hard work (much like what we see around here).
Third, excessive state control and the absence of accountability. The concern was how public institutions exercised their authority, whether citizens could challenge unfair treatment and whether the government was responsive to their grievances.
Fourth, unemployment and the frustration of young people. An educated generation had aspirations but increasingly limited opportunities. Young people’s education, energy and ambitions could not lead to meaningful economic participation.
Bouazizi’s death was just the catalyst, the conditions for an uprising had been developing before that fateful December morning.
Tunisia was not the only country where the price of food became a political question. In December 2018, protests in Sudan began following an increase in bread prices, against a background of economic decline, shortages and high inflation. The demonstrations eventually contributed to the removal of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic crisis offers another reminder of how a combination of poor economic decisions, external shocks and declining public trust can produce serious political consequences.
The common thread in all three countries, and many others I have not mentioned, was hardship that citizens believed their governments could not or would not address. Uganda is a different country, but the same test applies; can ordinary people afford the basics, and do they believe things will improve?
The political, institutional and economic circumstances are different. Uganda has a functioning banking sector, a relatively small but active private sector, imperfect public institutions, and an economy that looks like it still grows. Predicting an Arab Spring would therefore be irresponsible, but so would be the dismissal of the growing economic frustrations among ordinary Ugandans as exaggeration or isolated complaints.
The first issue to consider is taxation. Ugandans encounter taxation at different stages of their economic lives. An employed person pays Pay As You Earn (PAYE) before receiving their salary. When that person subsequently uses the remaining income to purchase taxable goods or services, they pay Value Added Tax (VAT). Fuel purchases attract excise duty, while other goods and services attract additional excise duties, import-related taxes and levies.
Do not get me wrong, there is nothing inherently wrong with paying taxes. Governments require revenue to finance public services, infrastructure, security, education, healthcare among others. The problem comes when the overall tax burden becomes disproportionate to the income available to households, and where public services do not adequately reflect the taxes collected.
Under the 2026/27 PAYE structure, the tax-free threshold was increased from UGX 235,000 to UGX 335,000, a positive intervention intended to increase take-home pay for lower-income earners. Nevertheless, the broader issue remains. Take my friend Emma earning UGX 1 million a month. Under the 2026/27 bands, PAYE takes UGX 188,250, or 18.8% of gross. Another UGX 50,000 goes to NSSF, which is his own retirement savings but still unavailable to him this month. That leaves UGX 761,750. Suppose he pays UGX 250,000 in rent, UGX 200,000 in transport (50k per week), UGX 150,000 on food, UGX 40,000 on utilities and airtime, and UGX 40,000 on healthcare and a few household items. That is UGX 918,000 total, and UGX 81,750 remains. It is 8% of what he earned. When food and transport each rise by 10%, that margin shrinks by more than a third. He has no buffer for a sick relative, a school fee or a loan repayment, and he still pays VAT of roughly UGX 15,000 on every UGX 100,000 of standard-rated goods he buys.
The government has also increased excise duty on petrol and diesel by UGX 200 per litre for the 2026/27 financial year, a move expected to raise UGX 450 billion in revenue. The problem is that fuel is not an isolated commodity. It is an input into almost every part of the economy and affects the cost of transporting agricultural produce, operating businesses, distributing consumer goods and delivering services. An increase in fuel costs therefore finds its way into the price of food, construction materials, transport and other necessities.
The government may reasonably argue that additional taxation is necessary to finance national development. But taxation must also be assessed against the ability of citizens to pay. There is a point at which increasing taxes on an already strained population risks undermining the very economic activity from which the government collects revenue. The small business that cannot expand, an employee whose salary cannot sustain basic needs or a household that spends nearly all its income on consumption are not becoming more economically productive.
The question should not only be how much revenue the government can collect, but also how effectively that revenue is translated into economic opportunity and improved living standards.
The second issue is the relationship between the US dollar and the Uganda shilling. There is a common perception that exchange rates matter mainly to importers, exporters and people travelling abroad. In reality, movements in the exchange rate have a direct impact on the cost of living.
Uganda imports a substantial proportion of the materials, machinery, fuel-related products, pharmaceuticals, industrial inputs, and other products and goods required to sustain our economy. When the shilling depreciates against the dollar, businesses require more shillings to purchase the same quantity of imported goods, and that additional cost must either be absorbed by businesses, reduce their profit margins or pass some, if not all, of it on to consumers.
The Ministry of Finance’s September 2026 Performance of the Economy report recorded that the shilling depreciated by 3.7% against the US dollar during September, trading at an average mid-rate of approximately UGX 3,868.87 per dollar, compared with UGX 3,730.25 in August. This has since increased to a record UGX 4,100-4,500 for every single dollar. This means that an importer who previously required UGX 37.3 million to purchase USD 10,000 would, at the latest average exchange rate, require approximately UGX 41-45 million for the same amount. That is an additional UGX 3.7-7.7 million before accounting for shipping, insurance, customs charges and other costs.
This brings us to what we all understand: the price of food. Bread, which has traditionally been an affordable household staple, is becoming increasingly expensive. In late October 2026, the Uganda Bakers Association announced an increase in bread prices, citing the rising cost of wheat flour, yeast, baking fats and transportation. The new wholesale price of a one-kilogramme loaf rose to UGX 5,500, with the recommended retail price reaching UGX 6,500 although some consumers are reporting higher prices. Meanwhile, a kilogramme of beans in some markets is approaching UGX 8,000.
Let’s consider a household purchasing one kilogramme of bread at UGX 6,500, one kilogramme of beans at UGX 7,000 and one litre of cooking oil at UGX 9,000. Assuming they are replenished twice a week, a household would spend approximately UGX 45,000 weekly on just these three basic food items, excluding vegetables, transport, rent, electricity, water, school fees, healthcare and other essential expenses that make up an ordinary household budget. For someone earning UGX 500,000 a month, the cost of these three items alone represents 36% of their gross monthly income. The concern is not that every household buys precisely these quantities or pays identical prices, it is that the space between household income and the cost of basic necessities is becoming increasingly narrow.
In this situation, a person whose salary has remained unchanged suddenly finds that the larger amount of money buys similar or fewer household necessities. This is how currency depreciation becomes a household crisis.
The government cannot control every international economic development. Global oil prices, geopolitical conflicts, international interest rates and disruptions to supply chains are beyond the direct control of the government. But the government can strengthen the country’s resilience by supporting domestic production, improving agricultural value chains, reducing unnecessary import dependence, expanding export capacity and maintaining credible macroeconomic management. It is not enough to explain why the shilling is weakening. Citizens also need to understand what the government is doing to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to these recurring shocks.
The government may point to relatively moderate headline inflation as evidence of economic stability. Such indicators are important, but they do not always capture the pressure experienced by individual households. In my layman opinion, the test of economic performance should include whether people can afford basic necessities, maintain their livelihoods and enjoy a reasonable standard of living.
The third issue is the cost of borrowing. For an ordinary citizen, borrowing is often necessary to finance a business, pay school fees, purchase property, meet medical expenses or manage unexpected financial obligations. For small and medium-sized enterprises, access to affordable credit can be the difference between expansion or closure.
In September 2026, the Ministry of Finance reported that the average weighted lending rate on shilling-denominated loans had increased to 17.90% in August, from 17.32% in July. The Bank of Uganda subsequently raised the Central Bank Rate from 9.75% to 12% in October. While monetary tightening is intended to contain inflationary pressures and support currency stability, it also has implications for businesses and households that depend on credit. It is important to understand that the Central Bank Rate is not the interest rate that every commercial bank charges its customers. It is a monetary policy instrument that influences the cost of money in the financial system. Commercial banks then determine their lending rates based on several factors, including the cost of deposits, operational expenses, credit risk and their profit margins.
The Bank of Uganda has a legitimate responsibility to maintain price stability. However, monetary policy must be accompanied by measures that address the structural weaknesses driving production costs upwards. It is not enough to make borrowing more expensive in the hope of controlling inflation while businesses continue to face high operating costs, limited access to affordable financing and an economy heavily dependent on imported inputs.
The bigger question is whether the government is sufficiently considering the cumulative effects of its economic and political decisions on ordinary households. Taxation, currency depreciation, bad policies, fuel prices, expensive credit and rising food costs are not isolated issues. They interact, and their combined effect determines how much income a household has left, if at all, after meeting its basic needs.
I am not an economist, at least in the professional sense, but I have come to learn that a positive macroeconomic outlook does not necessarily mean public satisfaction. We can register economic growth while a big proportion of our population experiences declining purchasing power, or attract foreign investment while small businesses struggle to access affordable credit. This is why I think that economic policy should not focus exclusively on inflation targets, foreign exchange reserves and GDP growth. These indicators matter, but they should be complemented by measures of household purchasing power, real wages, affordability and access to essential services.
The government has legitimate reasons for pursuing revenue mobilisation. Uganda has infrastructure requirements, public debt obligations and development priorities that require financing. However, revenue mobilisation should not be an end in itself. Tax policy should support an expanding productive economy instead of putting disproportionate pressure on those already contributing to the tax system, and there should be a demonstration that additional revenue is translating into better public services, economic opportunities and improved living standards.
Another issue is public expenditure and value for money. Citizens are more than willing to meet their tax obligations when they can see the benefits. They want functioning hospitals, affordable education, reliable roads, affordable agricultural support, employment opportunities and effective public institutions. When taxpayers see persistent waste, procurement irregularities, corruption or extravagant public expenditure alongside demands for additional revenue, people start to wonder why they must continuously make sacrifices when those entrusted with public resources are not always held to the same standards of accountability.
The experiences of Tunisia, Sudan and Sri Lanka demonstrate that economic hardships become particularly dangerous when accompanied by a growing perception that the government is either unwilling or unable to respond.
You may now please go ahead and ask, is Uganda approaching a breaking point? Probably not, although there are legitimate reasons for concern about the cumulative economic pressures Ugandans are facing. But there is an equally important need to distinguish between economic dissatisfaction and an imminent political uprising. Weakening currency, rising food prices, taxation and expensive borrowing do not automatically produce a revolution. Political crises however usually emerge from the interaction of economic hardship with other factors, including public distrust, perceived injustice, corruption, political exclusion and the absence of credible mechanisms through which grievances can be addressed. The danger is not necessarily that people cannot afford bread today, it is that they may increasingly believe that their circumstances will not improve tomorrow, regardless of how hard they work.
Uganda has an important demographic consideration, the young population represents enormous economic potential, but this potential can become a source of frustration when their hard work fails to offer realistic pathways to economic independence. The government must recognise that employment, affordable credit, access to markets and the cost of basic necessities are not peripheral development issues.
What should the government do then? Thank you for asking. Here’s my two cents about it:
The answer is not populist economics, reckless borrowing or the abandonment of necessary fiscal and monetary discipline. We need a practical approach that appreciates the relationship between revenue mobilisation, household welfare and economic productivity.
First, we need to undertake a review of the cumulative tax burden on households and small businesses. This should examine PAYE, VAT, excise duty, import-related taxes and other levies, taking into account their combined impact on disposable income and production costs. The government should consider targeted relief on essential production inputs and assess the consequences of additional fuel taxation. It should also examine whether the tax system puts a disproportionate burden on formal employees and compliant businesses.
Second, prioritise domestic production and food security. We have considerable agricultural potential, but we must do more to improve agricultural productivity, storage, processing, market access and distribution. Food affordability should not be left entirely to the forces of market supply and demand when structural weaknesses in agricultural value chains can be addressed through public investment and effective policy. The government should improve farmer access to affordable financing, irrigation, quality inputs, extension services and storage facilities.
Third, address the cost of doing business and access to affordable credit. The government and Bank of Uganda should continue working towards a financial environment in which productive enterprises can access reasonably priced financing. This includes improving credit information, strengthening financial regulation, supporting alternative financing mechanisms and ensuring that public financing facilities reach their intended beneficiaries.
Fourth, improve public expenditure accountability. The government needs to demonstrate that every additional shilling collected through taxation contributes meaningfully to national development. Public procurement, infrastructure spending, public-sector administration and government programmes must be subject to transparent oversight. The public should be able to see not just how much revenue is collected, but what that revenue achieves.
Bouazizi was not a political leader, or organising a revolution, he was a young man trying to earn a living in an economy with limited opportunities. The confiscation of his produce was not, by itself, sufficient for the collapse of Ben Ali’s government. What made his experience so important was that millions of people saw their own circumstances in his story. It should remind us that the grievances of ordinary people are important and deserve attention before they become crises. People need an economic and governance environment in which they can work, earn, save, borrow, invest and live with dignity.