By Dr. Yonas Workineh
Sudan’s accusations that Ethiopia is facilitating military support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have intensified and raising questions over Addis Ababa’s alleged role in a war that has increasingly drawn in regional actors.
The allegations have been repeatedly rejected by Ethiopia.
But a series of investigations, satellite-imagery assessments and statements from Sudanese officials have placed Ethiopia at the centre of growing scrutiny over the RSF’s access to training, logistics and military infrastructure.
The latest accusations come as Sudan’s deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, Gen. Malik Agar, sought to make clear that Khartoum does not want the dispute to develop into a direct conflict with Ethiopia.
“We do not want to get involved in a war with Ethiopia,” Agar told journalists at a media forum in Khartoum on Wednesday, according to Radio Tamazuj.
His comments came after Sudanese military officials accused Ethiopia of allowing RSF forces and allied groups to operate drones from its territory.
Evidence of an RSF presence inside Ethiopia
One of the most significant developments came from Reuters in February, when the agency reported that Ethiopia was hosting a training camp for fighters linked to the RSF in the country’s Benishangul-Gumuz region.
Reuters based its investigation on interviews with diplomatic, security and government sources, as well as satellite imagery. The investigation reported that the facility could be used to recruit and train RSF fighters and that thousands of people could potentially pass through the site.
The Reuters investigation also reported allegations that the United Arab Emirates had financed construction of the facility and provided logistical and training support. Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s involvement.
The UAE has repeatedly denied supporting the RSF.
The allegations nevertheless point to a potentially important regional supply network in which Ethiopia could provide territory and infrastructure while other actors allegedly provide financing, equipment or logistical assistance.
Yale satellite evidence adds another layer
The allegations were followed by independent satellite-based research from Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab.
In April, Yale HRL published a report titled “Evidence of Military Assistance to RSF at ENDF Base in Asosa, Ethiopia.” The laboratory reported evidence it interpreted as military assistance to RSF forces at an Ethiopian National Defense Force facility in Asosa.
Yale subsequently reported continued evidence of support at the Asosa facility in June. Its August 28 assessment went further, reporting that brigade-size support had been assembled at the ENDF base and describing the activity as associated with RSF operations.
The significance of the Yale findings lies in the location of the reported activity. The allegations are not simply about fighters crossing an uncontrolled border or operating from isolated areas. The research describes activity at or associated with an ENDF military installation.
That raises a more consequential question about the nature of the relationship between the RSF-linked forces and Ethiopian authorities.
However, satellite imagery can establish the presence and movement of people, vehicles and equipment without necessarily establishing the identity or intentions of every actor involved. It therefore does not, by itself, prove the full chain of command or establish who authorized the reported activity.
Sudanese officials allege a broader network
Sudanese officials have gone further than the international investigations. On September 3, Abdelati Mohamed El Faki, commissioner of Kurmuk, accused the RSF of operating four training camps inside Ethiopia with alleged UAE backing. He said the facilities were being used to train RSF fighters and foreign recruits and to support logistical and drone operations.
Several days later, El Faki repeated the accusations, alleging that foreign fighters had arrived at a camp in Ethiopia and that the UAE had facilitated their movement. Again, the claims were not independently verified.
These allegations suggest that Sudanese officials believe Ethiopia’s role extends beyond simply allowing RSF personnel to transit through its territory. But the claims remain allegations, and no publicly available evidence has conclusively established the full extent of Ethiopian government involvement.
The UAE is central to the allegations surrounding the RSF’s external support. Sudanese military officials have repeatedly accused Abu Dhabi of providing military and logistical assistance to the paramilitary group. The UAE has consistently denied the accusations.
A recent UN investigation found that foreign military support—including weapons, technology, personnel and logistical assistance—has helped sustain Sudan’s war. The investigation also documented the growing use of drones by the warring parties. The question surrounding Ethiopia is therefore not isolated from the wider internationalization of Sudan’s conflict.
If the allegations about UAE-linked financing and Ethiopian-based training facilities are accurate, the two countries would occupy different positions within a broader support network: the alleged financial and logistical role attributed to the UAE on one side, and the alleged provision of territory and facilities inside Ethiopia on the other.
Both governments have denied the allegations made against them.
Why Sudan is warning Ethiopia while avoiding war
Agar’s statement that Sudan does not want war with Ethiopia provides an important indication of Khartoum’s current position.
Sudan’s army is already fighting a prolonged war against the RSF. A direct confrontation with Ethiopia would create a potentially dangerous new front and could transform a regional involvement into a direct interstate conflict.
At the same time, Sudan’s military leadership has strong incentives to pressure Ethiopia over what it considers external support for the RSF.
This explains the increasingly forceful language coming from Sudanese officials alongside Agar’s warning that Khartoum does not want a war.
Sudan appears to be trying to raise the diplomatic cost of alleged Ethiopian support without crossing the threshold into direct military confrontation.
The issue is becoming increasingly difficult for Addis Ababa to dismiss solely as a Sudanese political accusation.
The available evidence comes from different sources: Reuters’ reporting relies on multiple sources and satellite imagery; Yale has conducted its own remote-sensing analysis; and Sudanese officials have made additional allegations. Taken together, these reports have created a growing body of evidence concerning RSF-linked activity inside Ethiopia.
The RSF’s reported access to external weapons, drones, financing, training and logistical networks has helped transform the war into a conflict whose military dynamics extend beyond Sudan’s borders. The UN has warned that foreign support is contributing to the continuation and intensification of the war.
Against that backdrop, Ethiopia’s alleged role has become particularly sensitive. If Ethiopian territory is being used to train, equip or launch operations involving RSF forces, the implications would extend beyond Sudan’s internal conflict. It would raise questions about Ethiopia’s regional policy, the involvement of other foreign actors and the possibility that Sudan’s war is becoming a proxy struggle involving multiple states.
For now, however, the precise relationship between the Ethiopian state, the reported facilities and the RSF remains contested.
What is becoming increasingly clear is that the RSF’s ability to operate across borders has made Ethiopia an important part of the debate over how Sudan’s war is being sustained—and how far the conflict could spread.
